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PUNISHMENT: DESERT AND
CRIME CONTROL
Ernest van den Haag*
PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND DANGEROUSNESS
IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS. By Andrew von Hirsch. New

Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press. 1985. Pp. xiv, 220. $25.
REDISCOVERING RETRIBUTION

Andrew von Hirsch has had a major role in making the part retribution plays in doing justice respectable once more, 1 after it had been
relegated to near oblivion in favor of rehabilitation. 2 He has helped
matters along by rechristening retribution "just deserts." And why
not? It is a catchy name (although pleonastic: "unjust deserts" would
be oxymoronic). The reacceptance of retribution was helped when it
was revealed, at long last, that rehabilitation by means other than age
was far too rare to warrant sentences tailored to so unlikely a
prospect. 3
In Past or Future Crimes Professor von Hirsch discusses rehabilitation briefly and deterrence occasionally to focus on the most recent
sentencing theory: "selective incapacitation." Rehabilitation, deterrence, and selective incapacitation propose sentences primarily meant
to control crime through sanctions based on the predicted future behavior of convicts (or, in the case of deterrence, of prospective offenders). Wherefore Professor von Hirsch rejects them. He wants
sentences to be determined by past behavior - by what is deserved for
the crime already committed. Sentences must be morally just, regardless of future effects on convicts or others. In the Kantian tradition,
punishment is not treated as a means of crime control, but primarily as
a deontological moral act, an end (if not a good) in itself.4 Laws must
prescribe and coUrts must impose the sentences crimes deserve.
Professor von Hirsch makes his points in workmanlike, if not ele-

*

John M. Olin Professor of Jurisprudence and Public Policy, Fordham University. - Ed.
1. See A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976).
2. In Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949), Justice Black expressed a common
contemporary view: "Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law."
3. See D. LIPTON, R. MARTINSON & w. WILKS, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL
TREATMENT (1975).
4. Unlike Professor von Hirsch, Kant did not always ignore deterrence. In his Lectures on
Ethics Kant wrote: "Ruling authorities do not punish because a crime has been committed, but
in order that crimes should not be committed." I. KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 56 (Methuen
Library Reprints 1979).
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gant prose. Cryptic phrases, such as "[s]elective incapacitation necessarily invalues such infringement" (p. 171), stand out because
fortunately rare. Throughout, he reproaches - or, as he writes,
reprobates - those interested in crime control for neglecting what is
deserved. He asserts, although he does not much argue, the absolute
priority of justice (retribution). It sounds good. Is he right? A satisfactory punishment certainly must be perceived to do justice. Yet it
must serve to control crime as well. If either of these two purposes of
the criminal justice system is dropped, or neglected in favor of the
other, we get a tidy, but not very helpful theory. Such is the case with
Past or Future Crimes, despite Professor van Hirsch's occasional gestures toward crime control. They make his "just deserts" theory less
tidy, but not more helpful.
By threatening future crimes the criminal law means to deter (control) them. (Threats always are meant to deter.) By punishing those
who were not deterred (criminals), we carry out legal threats and
make them credible. Further, by punishing offenders as threatened by
law, we do justice. Professor van Hirsch insists that to do justice
criminals must be punished according to what is deserved by the seriousness of their crimes. Fine. However, he implies, or at times asserts, that he has succeeded in establishing a nonarbitrary relationship
between crime, desert, and appropriate punishment. I don't think he,
or anyone, has.
Professor von Hirsch is right in rejecting sentences addressed primarily to the future behavior of offenders. Sentences based on prospects for rehabilitation, or on the need for incapacitation, would make
justice irrelevant by dealing with criminality as a disease requiring
treatment, or as a condition requiring isolation - as though the criminal were not a morally responsible person who deserves blame and
punishment in some proportion to his crime, just as others may deserve praise and reward for their achievements. 5
Diseases do not deserve blame; and treatments are neither just nor
unjust, only effective or ineffective. Criminal behavior obviously lacks
the characteristics usually associated with disease, such as involuntariness and undesiredness. Further, disease, unlike criminality, shortens
life, or is painful, or disabling. Finally, the criminal "disease" is voluntary while the "treatment" is not - the reverse of what ordinarily
characterizes diseases. Thus, the idea of criminality as illness (and of
treatment instead of punishment) is quite unpersuasive. It gained currency only because in the nineteenth century blame, as part of an extrascientific morality, was unacceptable to emancipated social
scientists. The disestablishment of rehabilitation as a sentencing crite5. Barbara Wootton in Crime and the Criminal Law was explicit in arguing that "the formal
distinction between prison and hospital [should be] •.• obliterated altogether." B. WoorroN,
CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 79-80 (1963).
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rion, however, does not establish Professor von Hirsch's claims for just
deserts. Neither does the unjustifiability of "selective incapacitation."
Selective incapacitation shares some of the crucial weaknesses of
rehabilitation as a sentencing criterion, although it drops the over-optimistic prospect of "cure" and the inappropriate medical model. Selective incapacitation proposes to incarcerate for as long as possible ideally until they are no longer dangerous - the convicts predicted to
recidivate frequently. While incapacitated they could not commit (extramural) crimes; this is expected to reduce the crime rate. Convicts
thought unlikely to recidivate would be incarcerated for a shorter
time, even though they had committed the same crime and had a similar conviction record. Professor von Hirsch objects convincingly that
the predictability of recidivism is insufficient for the proposed selecti9n. He argues further that it would lead to unequal sentences for the
same crime and, for offenders predicted to recidivate often, to
sentences disproportionate to the crimes so far committed. He is
right. Sentences would be determined by predictions as precarious as
they are irrelevant to what is deserved for the crimes already
committed.
Professor von Hirsch compromises retributionist theory somewhat. Although rejecting selective incapacitation he favors "categorical incapacitation," which also would require longer imprisonment for
categories of offenders predicted to be more dangerous than other categories. The length of incapacitation, however, would depend on the
recidivism associated with the category into which the crime committed falls, rather than on the predicted recidivism of the individual.
Thus, the sentence for all those who have committed the same crime
would be the same. Professor von Hirsch hopes to make sure that the
categorically incapacitative sentences are proportionate to the seriousness of the crimes. But it is hard to reconcile sentences according to
desert with sentences according to categorically (and precariously)
predicted recidivism. To the extent to which a sentence is based on
predicted recidivism, the sentence may not be what the crime deserves,
if desert refers to the past, as it must.
Yet Professor von Hirsch need not have worried about how to reconcile prolonged incapacitation based on predictions of dangerousness
with punishment according to desert. Convicts could be punished according to desert as he proposes. Those deemed dangerous, by categorical or selective prediction, still could be confined until no longer
dangerous. Such additional confinement need be regarded as punishment no more than the confinement of the insane need be morally
deserved. We confine some of the insane against their will not because
they are blameworthy, nor even because they are insane, but because
they are dangerous. We may similarly incapacitate offenders certain
to endanger us in the proximate future. Incapacitation here is not a
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punishment but a means of social protection. Although we cannot
punish him for what he has not, as yet, done, we can incapacitate
someone we know to be about to commit a murder. I do not see the
philosophical difficulty which Professor van Hirsch strives so mightily
to overcome. He creates it by unnecessarily conflating incapacitation
with punishment. Actually, punishment is only one of several possible
purposes of incapacitation, which can be imposed independently, as is
done with the insane. The real difficulty is empirical and suffices to
discard preemptive incapacitation of offenders beyond the punishment
deserved: We are unable to predict with enough accuracy the dangerousness of individuals. Unlike Professor van Hirsch, I do not think
our ability to predict the dangerousness of categories is adequate
either.
Professor van Hirsch compromises "just deserts" not only by reluctantly favoring categorical incapacitation, but also by enthusiastically asking courts to consider the availability of prison space in
sentencing, as though judges were real estate agents. Surely it is for
legislators, not for sentencers, to consider the availability of prison
space and either to build more prisons as needed, or to reduce prison
terms if preferred. It is hard to see why crowding of prisons (or vacancies) could decrease (or increase) the just deserts of convicts.
Is R.ETRIBUTIONIST THEORY SUFFICIENT?

If desert is as necessary a criterion of punishment as Professor von
Hirsch claims, is it as sufficient as he claims? In its pure form retributionist theory proposes punishment according to desert, regardless of
effects on the criminal - such as rehabilitation, or incapacitation and regardless of deterrent effects. Retributionists do not deny such
effects. After all, most punishments will incapacitate offenders at least
temporarily, thereby reducing their ability to commit crimes. Further,
the anticipation of retribution is likely to deter some future offenders.
However, retributionists resolutely disregard these effects as sentencing criteria, since they are irrelevant to the moral desert which retributionists see as the only justification for punishment. Perhaps it is.
Certainly moral desert is the only moral justification for punishment;
but we cannot really know what punishment crimes deserve; wherefore the just desert principle is not sufficient to determine a punishment scale.
According to just deserts theory, the seriousness of the crime alone
should determine the pup.ishment deserved. Seriousness, in tum, depends on the harm done and on the culpability of the offender. Surely
both are relevant. But since harm is always a consequence and often a
contingent one, from Professor von Hirsch's deontological (certainly
nonconsequentialist) standpoint the wickedness of the intent alone
might be expected to count. However, this would· make the just
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deserts criterion quite impractical. Professor von Hirsch, therefore,
remains wisely silent on culpability versus harm. We are not told
whether more punishment is deserved by an offender who is very culpable (his crime was premeditated) but does little harm (he did not
succeed in poisoning his wife: by accident he gave her sugar instead of
strychnine) or by one who does great harm but was merely negligent.
Which crime is more "serious"?
Professor von Hirsch further appears to believe that the comparative seriousness of crimes can be determined in all cases. Not so.
Comparative seriousness can be determined only for some crimes, and
it does not fully determine the comparative punishment deserved. If
rape is a crime and murder is a crime, rape-murder must be more
serious than either. Does rape-murder deserve the sum of the punishments meted out for rape and for murder? More? Less? Even when
crimes are nearly homogeneous, assigning seriousness is arbitrary: Is
rape more serious than assault with a deadly weapon? Is burglary
more serious than fraud when fraud does more harm? What about
mishandling toxic waste? Ordinal determinations of seriousness become altogether arbitrary when the seriousness of heterogeneous
crimes must be compared. The law somehow settles these matters.
But just deserts theory offers no rational criterion of comparative seriousness, no guide to legislators.
Once we have decided that crime A is more serious than crime B,
we still have to decide how much more, if we want to decide how
much more punishment is deserved. However, ordinal criteria tell us,
at best, thatA is more serious thatB, not how much more. Hence, our
decision on how much more punishment A deserves is arbitrary. Professor von Hirsch offers us no principle on which to base it. He discusses "cardinal proportionality" as if it somehow could tell how
much more serious A is than B. It does not. It merely labels the
problem without solving it. Possibly his "cardinal proportionality"
also refers to the relationship between the seriousness of the crime and
what is deserved for it. However, "cardinal proportionality" neither
justifies the degree of seriousness assigned to crimes nor the punishment deserved for that degree.
Just deserts fails even more fundamentally to tell us what is deserved for any crime. Suppose we agree that murder is a serious crime
and burglary a less serious one. Thus murder deserves more punishment than burglary, though nothing tells us how much more. But
what does murder deserve in the first place? Execution? Life in
prison? Twenty years? Ten? Just deserts theory cannot tell. Professor von Hirsch appears to deal with the problem under the heading of
"anchoring the penalty scale"; but he does not really address it. Thus,
contrary to what he appears to believe, there is no way of determining
whether any penalty scale is "inflated or deflated" in terms of what is
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deserved. The just deserts criterion does not justify his opinion that
murder deserves X any more than it justifies mine that murder deserves 2X. Just deserts seems to be a question masquerading as the
answer. The question seems quite justified. Unfortunately no answer
can be.
Politicians may be guided by the answers people actually give
when asked what punishments are deserved for various crimes. These
answers indicate what is desired and acceptable. However, they
mainly reflect the customary scale of punishments and cannot be the
basis for a "correct" scale. The people, no more than the philosophers, can give any reason for believing that burglary deserves five
years in prison and murder fifteen, rather than three and nine, or three
and six. To be sure, no system in need of public support can afford
penalties that greatly deviate from popular opinion. Still, that opinion
about what is right, or just, is no more than an opinion. A theory of
punishment which, in effect, simply tells us that whatever punishments
are popularly accepted are ipso facto just, or right, scarcely deserves to
be called a theory. A theory is meant to shape opinion according to
justifiable rational principles, rather than merely to follow it.
Theories which propose punishments according to expected rehabilitative, incapacitative, or deterrent effects may be morally faulty and
empirically unfounded. Yet they are superior to just deserts theory in
that they offer, in principle (though not necessarily in practice), a test
for the appropriateness of punishments: the punishment that rehabilitates, or incapacitates the dangerous, or deters prospective offenders is
the appropriate punishment. Just deserts theory insists that punishment be what is deserved by the seriousness of the crime. But we are
not told how to measure seriousness or how to relate it to punishment.
For this reason I think Professor von Hirsch's "impatience'' with "attempts to treat justice as anything but central" (p. 172) is misplaced.
Retribution must play a role, but scarcely a central one, since it cannot
tell us how to punish crimes.
Professor von Hirsch's "impatience" is wrongheaded for another
reason as well. He appears to be concerned about justice to convicts,
who, he thinks, may be victimized by excessive punishment (punishment beyond what he thinks is deserved). But even if disproportionate
to the crime - whatever that means - punishment is not unjust to
the criminal. Society does have an interest in avoiding unwise or excessive punishments, but not because such punishments are unjust to
convicts. A punishment cannot be unjust to the convict, who has volunteered to commit a crime and, thereby, to assume the risk of suffering the legally prescribed punishment. He could have avoided the
risk. If what he volunteered to risk does occur, he suffers an injustice
no more than a man who risked his fortune gambling does when he
loses it. The convict, or the gambler, suffered a misfortune which may
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kindle our compassion; but neither suffered an injustice. There is no
injustice in suffering what one volunteered to take the risk of suffering.
Justice does not protect against risks, however exorbitant, one volunteers to assume. The punishment prescribed by law may be less or
more than the crime deserved by some reckoning. The punishment
may be, as it were, unjust (disproportionate) to the crime. But the
punishment cannot be unjust to the criminal, since he volunteered to
assume the risk of suffering it. Professor von Hirsch is mistaken in
conflating punishment disproportionate to the seriousness of the crime
with injustice to the criminal.
We must try to mete out sentences according to what is felt to be
deserved by the crime, because the criminal justice system needs general support which is predicated on a popular feeling that the system
does justice according to desert. But, contrary to Professor von
Hirsch's claim, the just deserts principle does not prescribe a scale of
penalties, or enable us to do so, beyond suggesting that punishments
must be felt to be deserved, that is, felt somehow to retribute (pay
back) for the moral and material injuries crimes cause. The lex talionis, which originally limited private vengeance, cannot determine
public retribution which is meant to vindicate the law. Therefore we
do not limit the time for which we confine a kidnapper to the time for
which he confined his victim. Neither do we torture torturers. There
need not be an equivalence of suffering. Retribution is circumscribed,
albeit vaguely, only by our sense of proportion.
COULD INCAPACITATION HELP?

The ''just deserts" theory tries to answer a moral question: What
punishments are morally deserved? Since the theory does not ask the
consequentialist question - what punishments will control crime? it cannot be expected to answer it. However, Professor von Hirsch
hopes that "categorical incapacitation" will help control the crime rate
because the incapacitation of likely recidivists will reduce crime. Most
criminologists accept this idea in some form; so do most prosecutors.
Yet incapacitation of likely recidivists is irrelevant to controlling most
crime.
Criminologists traditionally want to know why some people commit crimes occasionally, others frequently, and still others not at all.
Few concern themselves with a question which seems far more relevant to crime control: Why is the crime rate what it is - why is it
neither higher nor lower? The answer suggests that incapacitation of
future career criminals per se (i.e., independent of deterrent effects)
cannot be effective in controlling most crimes. Even incapacitation of
all convicted offenders would not be.
Ifwe incapacitated the dentists who currently see most patients, or
the most active prostitutes, or if we incapacitated all practicing den-
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tists or prostitutes, the rate of dentistry, or prostitution, would be reduced - but only temporarily. It would return within a short time to
what it was. Because demand would not be affected while the supply
of these services would be reduced, the price would rise and attract
newcomers until as many persons would render dental or sexual services as before, whereupon the price would fall back to the old level. To
be sure, not everybody is capable of becoming a dentist, or a prostitute, and many are unwilling at any price. Normally, however, there
are enough capable persons willing to replace incapacitated practitioners if the price is right. The price that attracted the previous number
of practitioners will do so again. The effect of incapacitation on the
rate at which most crimes are committed does not differ from the effect of incapacitation on the rate of dentistry or prostitution. Incapacitation would have some short-term but no long-term effect on most
crimes.
Many crimes are market-dependent: they become profitable only
as the proceeds (or, in the case of prostitution, the services themselves)
are sold. That is why prices play so important a role. Theft, car theft,
truck hijacking, and burglary are market-dependent. Incapacitation
per se (apart from deterrence) has only short-term effects on the rate
at which market-dependent crimes occur. They become more lucrative (prices rise) as practitioners are incapacitated. This attracts more
newcomers until the price of stolen goods (or unlawful services) falls
to the original level. Thus the rate (say of car theft) would not change
in the end. Incapacitation causes different, but not fewer persons to
engage in criminal activity.
Other crimes such as rape, or the taking of money, do not depend
on a market since there is no market for rape and no need to sell
money. Therefore, rape does not become more lucrative, or attractive,
through incapacitation of .convicted rapists. While deactivating some
rapists, incapacitation would not attract newcomers and might reduce
the rate at which rape is committed by repeat offenders. (The incapacitation of one-time offenders would make no difference.) 6
Most criminals, however, do not specialize. The burglar is a rapist
as well, dependent on opportunity. It follows that incapacitation of
rapists may accomplish little, even with respect to rape, since it would
not reduce the rate of burglary and incidental rape. Further, although
there certainly are high- and low-rate offenders, the notion of career
criminals - persons who remain high-rate offenders when others
taper off owing to advancing age - is questionable. It seems likely
that both high- and low-rate offenders reach their peak by age eighteen
6. As more rapists, or robbers, are incapacitated, however, the unused opportunities for rape
and robbery would increase. As better opportunities become available the net gain from these
crimes would rise, making them more attractive and thereby enticing more newcomers. This
may or may not offset the reduction of these crimes by incapacitation of repeat offenders.
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and begin to taper off in their twenties. Thus, unless they are incapacitated between the ages of fourteen and twenty, incapacitation would
lock the door after the period of maximal criminal activity of those
incapacitated has passed. 7
DETERRENCE DETERMINES CRIME RATES

The rate at which crimes are committed generally depends on the
net advantage they are expected to yield compared to the alternatives
available to criminals. The comparative net advantage of crime consists of the material or psychological benefit expected less the expected
cost to the criminal. The main cost to the criminal is punishment the threatened punishment discounted by the improbability of suffering it. (The threatened legal punishment itself is only the list price
which no criminal expects to pay.)
The gross benefit of crime to the criminal is hard to change by any
governmental policy. The cost to the criminal, which codetermines
the net benefit, however, depends on the probability and severity of
punishment. Given the severity of punishment, society can manipulate, to some extent, the probability of suffering it; and society can
readily determine severity. Either way, the cost of crime to the criminal can be changed and therewith the net benefit to him. 8 Thus the
crime rate, ceteris paribus, depends on the punishment society is willing to impose on criminals. Prospective criminals react to incentives
and disincentives as do most people. They react to changes in incentives and disincentives more sensitively than persons already committed to crime. Incentives and disincentives influence the formation of
habits, criminal or not, more than they affect habits already formed.
In this respect, criminals react as other groups do: changes in the
wages of miners will influence prospective miners more than those
who are already in the pits.9
A caveat may be apposite. No conscious calculation of costs and
benefits by prospective criminals is implied. They do not consciously
calculate any more than prospective dentists or purchasers (or
nonpurchasers) of Rolls Royces do. People usually adapt their behavior to incentives and disincentives without explicit or conscious calculations. Only those who wish to predict the effects of incentives and
disincentives must calculate. Those to whom the incentives or disincentives are offered need not. The rats to whom experimenters offer
7. On this matter see Gottfredson & Hirschi, The True Value ofLambda Would Appear to be
CRIMINOLOGY 213 (1986).
8. Punishment is the only cost to the offender which the criminal justice system can influence
directly. Other costs he may bear - e.g., guilt feelings - are hard to influence by social
measures. Still other factors such as age, genes, sex, family, income, religion, custom, and social
structure also play a role. But they are not readily subject to social control.
9. Much research on deterrence only observes effects on criminal habits and not on habit
formation.
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incentives or disincentives do not calculate. Yet we observe that they
are guided by the incentives and disincentives which become part of
their environment. Io
The disincentive effect of punishment threats can be calculated in
principle: an increase in severity and/or probability of punishment
will lead, ceteris paribus, to a decrease of crime. The extent depends
on the elasticity of the supply of crime, which must be established by
observation. Thus, a coherent and nonarbitrary scale of punishments
which determines the cost of crimes to criminals (and thus the net
gain) could be worked out. I I It would not directly depend on ''just
deserts," but on the moral and material considerations which may (or
may not) lead us to prefer more punishment to more crime. Crime
can be deterred to the degree to which society is willing to bear the
moral and material costs of the punishments needed to deter it. I 2 In
effect, for each kind of crime the question would be: Do we want to
reduce it by X, if this means increasing the punishment for it by Y? 13
(Disincentives are never costless, although often likely to cost less than
the crimes they deter.)
The arbitrary sanctions regarded as just deserts are not meant, nor
are they likely, to control crime. Neither does incapacitation. But a
deterrent scale of punishment will. Such a deterrent scale can be consistent with deserts, although independent of them, since the just
deserts criterion does not actually determine, or exclude, any specific
scale of punishments.
A rational scale of punishments controls crime by reducing the
rate at which each crime is committed to the rate we are willing to
10. I use the word "environment" to stress that, contrary to factitious dichotomies, legal
incentives and disincentives can be just as much a part of the environment as natural ones - a
point that has been ignored ever since Enrico Ferri first ignored it in his seminal CRIMINAL
SOCIOLOGY 76 (1896).
11. Punishments would almost entirely depend on their consequences, the crime rates they
allow. Thus, punishments would be objectively determined, once the community, or its legislators, have made a value judgement to decide what crime rates to tolerate rather than bear the
cost of altering them. The material cost and the material benefit of punishments are knowable,
but a value judgement about the moral cost and the moral benefit still is required. This, however,
would be the only value judgement needed to determine the size of punishments ordinally and
cardinally. In contrast, any retributive scale of punishments requires value judgements about the
seriousness of each crime, the punishment appropriate to that seriousness, and the size of the
differences between crimes and between punishments. None of these judgements would be related to consequences. All punishments would be determined by deontic moral judgements
based on intuition and tradition.
12. Philosophers often have objected that, to use punishments as a means to deter, is, impermissibly, to use convicts as mere means for social ends not their own. Since, however, the
criminals (hoping to attain their own ends) have volunteered for the risk of being so used, this
venerable objection lacks merit.
13. A minimal crime rate would remain, even if disincentives were maximized, because some
persons do not respond to any disincentive. Moreover, as disincentives increased there would be·
diminishing reductions in the crime rate. (There is no indication that this point has been reached
in the United States.) Finally, the greater availability of criminal opportunities, see note 6 supra,
would encourage some newcomers.
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tolerate rather than bear the moral and material cost of further reduction. This scale of punishments may also serve to satisfy the independently perceived demands of justice, for the punishment that reduces
the crime as desired (in view of the cost of further reduction) may be
the punishment the crime is perceived to deserve. Both the desire to
deter and to exact retribution depend on the perceived seriousness of
the crime. 14
Professor von Hirsch's Past and Future Crimes takes "just deserts"
theory just about as far as it will go - which is not quite far enough.
Still, his book contains many stimulating observations and arguments
and makes a major contribution to the exhaustion of possibilities.
14. The punishment needed to deter also depends on the attractiveness of a crime which may
not coincide with its seriousness.

